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In Fear of International Law
IVAN SHEARER*
The thesis of this paper is that governments of some otherwise enlightened
states are increasingly fearful of acknowledging the restraints imposed on them
by existing international law. They are also reluctant to enter into new com-
mitments by way of international conventions that would expand the reach of
international law. The paper asks whether these fears are based on a true under-
standing of international law or on some distorted view of it. It will draw com-
parisons and some contrasts between Australia and the United States in their
reactions to a number of recent events as well as to some enduring situations of
contemporary relevance. Had time (and the limits of my research) permitted,
one might also have examined public attitudes toward international law in
China, Japan, and Russia in this context, where similar fears appear to be enter-
tained. France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, also enlightened
states, appear by contrast to belong to a group more dedicated to international
law. As Robert Kagan has recently remarked, the experience of two world wars
at close quarters, and the formation of the European Union, have made the Eu-
ropean countries more dedicated to process, where the United States is more in-
terested in results.'
I. THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
As the Latin adage has it, ubi societas ibijus: "where a society exists, law ex-
ists also." It is a natural consequence of men and women living in society that
they must necessarily be governed by rules. Whether those rules are just or even
rational is another question. As Sir Thomas More, King Henry VIII's chancel-
*George P. Smith Distinguished Visiting Professor, Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington; Former Challis Professor of International Law, University of Sydney, Australia;
L.L.B., L.L.M. (Adelaide), S.J.D. (Northwestern).
1. Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, POL'Y REV., June-July 2002, at 3. Or is it that the U.S.
government is split between those supporting vigorous, decisive, and unilateral action, and those
supporting multilateral approaches, including working through the United Nations, as declared
by David Frum and Richard Perle in their recent article Beware the Soft-Line Ideologies, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 7,2004, at A 12. Those in the first camp are said to include Vice-President Cheney, Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. Those in the second include former Secretary of State
Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage, and Brent Scowcroft.
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lor, and revered now as a martyr and saint, once declared, it is better to have bad
law than no law at all. A reminder of this is the near anarchy that has prevailed
in recent times in such places as Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia, where any idea
of civil society broke down.
We date the emergence of a clear concept of a society of nations bound by in-
ternational law to the recognition of the independent states of Europe in the
Peace of Westphalia, 1648, following the end of the wars of religion. Interna-
tional law is thus a relatively new phenomenon. It is dynamic in nature as the
rules necessarily emanating from the fact of states living in society are made
more numerous and complex in order to deal with changing circumstances and
new needs. Moreover, in addition to the rules found necessary in any society, a
whole host of new rules has come into existence as the result of political efforts
to transform international society into an international community.2 The pri-
mary reflection of this transition from society to community lies in the creation
of the League of Nations after the First World War and the United Nations
(U.N.) after the Second World War. Yet some nations stood aside from the
former, notably the United States, or later withdrew from it. They feared a dim-
inution of their sovereignty. Even today, deep-seated reservations are held in
certain influential quarters in both Australia and the United States in relation to
the United Nations. There are also new areas of law developing in what has
been called the international law of cooperation, such as in the regulation of
trade, the protection of natural resources, and the control of the environment.
In order to evaluate this fear, it is important to have a clear view of the
sources of international law. As confirmed in article 38 of the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, those sources are: (a) treaties, conventions, and other
forms of international agreement between states that bind them (contractually)
in their relations; (b) customary international law based on general state practice;
(c) general principles of law common to national legal systems; and (d) judicial
decisions of international and national courts and tribunals and the opinions of
learned writers, as subsidiary sources of law.
It can be seen that international law is essentially a voluntarist system of law.
The first source is most obviously voluntarist. No state is obliged to enter into a
treaty with any other state, but if it does so it accepts the rights and obligations
flowing from that treaty. For example, the United States has chosen not to be-
2. The German theorists of the nineteenth century expressed this as a transition from Gesell-
schaft to Gemeinschaft.
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come a party to the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court. Austra-
lia, by contrast, has accepted that treaty. What prior legal principle makes such a
treaty binding? That principle is pacta sunt servanda-the general principle
common to all national legal systems that agreements are to be observed in good
faith. Some would buttress this legal justification with a political one. Formal
promises are binding because states seek reciprocity and security in relations: no
one trusts a person (or a state) who breaks his (or its) promises.
The second source is also essentially voluntarist, but only if understood with
a degree of subtlety. Customary international law consists of those principles and
rules that have been accepted by the great majority of states, as evidenced by
their practice or acquiescence, and provided further that there is a demonstra-
tion of their conviction that the posited rule is-or ought by logical or practical
necessity to be 3-binding on them (opiniojuris).4 As laid down by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 5 perfect unifor-
mity of state practice is neither to be expected nor required for a rule to enter into
force as customary international law. But it is essential that the rule be accepted
by the great majority of states, including those most affected by the existence of
such a posited rule. Moreover, the practice of the more powerful states is more
significant than that of the smaller states since it is more likely that the practice
of the former, by virtue of their widespread interests, would have "brought them
that way" previously. Extending the metaphor of the great Belgian jurist Charles
De Visscher, likening the field of customary law to a piece of vacant ground, one
3. This is my preferred interpretation of the Latin expression opiniojurissive necessitatis (some-
times rendered as opiniojuris ex necessitate). For to state that a rule must already be thought to be
binding at the same time as initial state practice has occurred presents a logical difficulty in that
the first examples of state practice must have been based on a false assumption. If, however, "ne-
cessitatis" is conceived of in terms of the natural law or of logical or practical necessity, the diffi-
culty is avoided.
4. Practices unaccompanied by the conviction that they are required by law remain in the
realm of courtesy or comity. An example often given is the salute customarily given at sea by the
warship of one nation to that of another. Weightier examples include the non-recognition of a
duty to extradite criminals in the absence of a treaty obligation, and the absence of a legal duty to
grant development assistance to poorer countries, both of which practices are nonetheless widely
observed. The latter example is often regulated through the mechanism of memoranda of under-
standing (MOUs), which are agreements in non-binding form, as evidenced by the avoidance of
language normally associated with legally binding intentions.
5. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
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could say that the footprints of the elephants are more indelibly marked than
those of the rabbits.6
The emergence of customary law out of state practice, especially in the form
of adherence to international conventions of a normative character, adhered to
by a large number of states, but not by the United States, might be ruled out ac-
cording to the criteria specified by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
passages referred to above. Moreover, the Court has also recognized the notion
of the "persistent objector," that is, of the right of a state to opt out of any consen-
sus gathering around a posited rule, provided it makes its contrary position clear
early enough and before the rule has crystallized.7 Nevertheless, fears remain in
certain quarters in the United States that political majorities in the United Na-
tions and other forums may conspire to promote rules of customary interna-
tional law inimical to the interests of the United States. Specific examples of
these concerns will be discussed later in this paper.
The third source-general principles of law common to civilized nations-
consists of a body of rules of an auxiliary, but necessary character, that would not,
owing to their nature, be the normal subject of state practice as such. Examples
of such rules or principles arepacta sunt servanda, the principle of good faith, no-
tions of equity and of due process of law, estoppel, and methods of proof of facts.8
Some see in this source of law recognition of the continuing influence of natural
law. In practice it seems that the ICJ has been satisfied that a principle is general
if it is recognized in both the common law and the civil law traditions.
The fourth, and final, source of international law specified in the Statute of
the International Court of Justice is the oddly grouped categories of judicial de-
cisions and the opinions of learned writers (quaintly termed in the Statute "the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations"). However, article 59 of
the Statute makes it clear that decisions of the ICJ are not binding except as be-
tween the parties to the decision. (Decisions, however, do tend to have strong
precedent value.) It should not be overlooked that national courts also can make
valuable contributions to the understanding and interpretation of international
law in the course of decisionmaking on questions of international law that arise
as part of domestic law. Examples include the interpretation of such conventions
6. CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 254-55 (P.E.
Corbett trans., Princeton Univ. Press rev'd ed. 1968) (1957).
7. See, e.g., Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
8. See The Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 9).
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as the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1984 Torture Convention, the 1929 War-
saw Convention on International Air Carriage, as well as of the application of
customary law, for example the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Perversely, in
the last case, national courts by virtue of internal rules of stare decisis can en-
trench outdated views of customary international law.9 The U.S. courts have
made significant contributions to the development of international law.'" The
awards of international arbitral tribunals have also had a significant impact on
the development of international law."
It would be invidious, and probably impossible, to single out writers of au-
thority who have most influenced the development of international law. It is eas-
ier to recall the names of some of those authors who have published general
treatises on international law, which tend regularly to be cited before both inter-
national and national courts and tribunals. Oppenheim springs most readily to
mind in the Anglophone literature, in its various editions through to Lauter-
pacht and now Jennings and Watts. 2 Those works tend not to be argumentative
but to state what is clearly established as international law.'3 It is notable that few
general works covering the whole of international law have been written in re-
cent times by American scholars. The field seems to have been left mostly clear
for British, other European, and Latin-American writers. (I can offer no expla-
nation for this.) Argumentative writers, who propose in specialized mono-
graphs or periodical articles a particular view of a disputable question, will be
cited in support of whatever interest is espoused in judicial or arbitral proceed-
ings, or in diplomatic exchanges. The qualification "most highly qualified" is
9. In Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 1 Q.B. 529 (1977), Lord Denning
M.R. was willing to disregard prior binding decisions of the House of Lords, reflective of the old
international law rule of absolute sovereign immunity, in favor of giving effect to the more re-
cently developed rule of qualified, or restrictive, immunity that would not shield the trading or
commercial activities of governments from suit in the English courts. His fellow judges in the
Court of Appeal, however, shrank from this step and decided the case against immunity on other
grounds.
10. The famous opinions of Chief Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court, starting with The
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (I Cranch) 116 (1812), come readily to mind.
11. An outstanding example is the award of the arbitral tribunal established by Canada and the
United States in Trail Smelter 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
12. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings et al. eds., 9th ed. 1992). Other large
"magisterial" works include those of Ian Brownlie, D.P. O'Connell, and G. Schwarzenberger.
13. As one of my colleagues is apt to joke, "If it's in Oppenheim, it's international law." By nec-
essary implication, if a rule is not to be found there, it is either not law or not yet clearly established
as such (lexferenda).
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not taken literally in practice, although of course the better known the author
the more attention is likely to be paid to the opinion. In the extensive (and seem-
ingly ever increasing) periodical literature and number of monographs on par-
ticular topics support will be found for almost any proposition. But this is not to
say that the discipline of international law is in disarray. The breadth and weight
of general opinion must also be taken into account.
It is therefore evident-at least to me-that there is nothing intrinsically
threatening to the vital interests of states in the sources of international law. The
two major sources are essentially voluntarist in nature. There is no international
legislature capable of forcing states to submit to the wishes of a majority. The in-
ternational community makes laws for itself through persuasion and consent.
Insofar as international custom is constitutive of universally binding law, and in-
sofar as practice may be constituted by the opiniojuris and subsequent concor-
dant practice of states adhering to multilateral conventions, there is always the
opt-out possibility of the persistent objector, as mentioned above, or of the ab-
stention from the practice by one or more of the states which would be especially
affected by such a rule. 4
II. PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
I have deliberately begun this essay with an elementary survey of the nature
of international law because of the widespread ignorance about its nature in cur-
rent political discourse. We must understand the basic elements of the interna-
tional legal system so that we do not fall into the trap of either undervaluing it or
expecting too much of it.
We have experienced a public debate recently in Australia (which is likely to
continue) on the relevance of international law to the formulation and execution
of government policy, and also on the legitimacy of reference to international
14. See generally North Sea Continental Shelf (ER.G. v. Den.; ER.G. v. Neth.) [19691 I.C.J. 4
(Feb. 20). It is implied by dicta of the Court in this case that practice based on the execution of treaty
obligations should be discounted as practice potentially constitutive of a customary rule; only free-
standing practice should count. This view must be questioned, since if there were 99% adherence to
a convention, then logically no parallel customary rule could ever crystallize. The better view, in
my opinion, is that customary law emanating from widely accepted multilateral conventions
merely reverses the historic order of customary law creation. The opiniojuris comes first, in the
form of what states believe is, or ought to be, the law and as expressed by them in the conference ne-
gotiations. Practice then follows in the form of application of the convention's provisions.
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law standards by judges in developing the common law and filling in the gaps
left by statute law. Misunderstandings of the nature of international law have
been very evident. Polemicists either attribute a false certainty to international
law, or dismiss it altogether as irrelevant. There are, I think, parallel emanations
of that misunderstanding here in the United States.
In relation to the intervention in Iraq, which began in March 2003, and in
which Australia played a significant role as a partner of the United States and
the United Kingdom in the coalition forces, critics of the Australian Govern-
ment asserted that the U.N. Charter forbade such an action in the absence of ex-
plicit endorsement by the Security Council. This, as will appear from what I
shall argue later, is to take an unduly rigorous view of the Charter and ignores
possible (and to me persuasive) considerations that the intervention was compat-
ible with international law. To view international law-and indeed the laws of
any domestic legal order-as a rigid set of clear rules is a common error made by
non-lawyers everywhere. Journalists and opinion and editorial writers abound
who share this misunderstanding.
At the other end of the spectrum lie those politicians and commentators
who have read somewhere that "international law is not really law" in the sense
that it can be enforced against evil-doers through an international police force,
international courts, and international jails. So they readily fall for the line that
law is merely the projection of power, and we might as well live with that fact. It
is distressing that these people have been given comfort by one who understands
international law very well but has become cynical about it. Referring to the sys-
tem of collective security established by the U.N. Charter in the wake of the in-
tervention in Iraq, Professor Michael Glennon of the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy at Tufts University has spoken of the end of a grand "experi-
ment."1 5 In my view this is a counsel of despair. I hope it is not widely shared in
academic circles in the United States.
At the political level we have to consider the similar views of the Honorable
John Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security in
the U.S. State Department. At the November 12, 2003 National Lawyers Con-
15. Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2003, at
16. See also Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of War: Self-defense, Inherence and Incoherence in Article 51
of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539 (2002). Thomas M. Franck provides
a trenchant refutation of Glennon's views. See Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The
United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607,617 (2003).
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vention, sponsored by the Federalist Society, Mr. Bolton effectively dismissed in-
ternational law as a necessary element in the justification of foreign policy. He
sees the basis of state power as lying in the consent of the people governed, ex-
pressed through national law:
Indeed, there's a fundamental problem of democratic theory for
those who contend, implicitly or otherwise, that the proper oper-
ation of America's institutions of representative government are
not able to confer legitimacy for the use of force. Make no mis-
take: not asserting that our constitutional procedures themselves
confer legitimacy will result over time in the atrophying of our
ability to act independently.... [This] has been fundamentally
misunderstood in the U.N. system. Many in the U.N. Secretariat
and many U.N. member governments in recent Security Council
debates have argued directly to the contrary. Increasingly, they
place the authority of international law, which does not derive di-
rectly from the consent of the governed, above the authority of na-
tional law and constitutions.
This argument has been raised in Australia under the banner of "the demo-
cratic deficit," but more in relation to international conventions than in relation to
customary law or the U.N. Charter. There was disquiet that Australia might, for
reasons of diplomatic expediency, be led into unwise commitments engineered by
the United Nations and other committees, which are comprised of representatives
of a number of countries, not all of them democratic. That debate led in a short
time to the establishment of a Standing Committee of the Australian Parliament
to review all international agreements which the executive government planned to
sign or ratify in order to advise on their desirability, whether or not their imple-
mentation was dependent on implementing legislation. This development en-
joyed the support of all the main political parties. By contrast, I do not think that
any government leader in Australia would argue that the U.N. Charter does not
impose restraints on the nation, and that our ability to use force is entirely a matter
for the duly elected government of the day and the Constitution and laws of Aus-
tralia. The view would be taken that we are necessarily constrained in matters as
fundamental as peace and war by our membership in the United Nations and the
provisions of the U.N. Charter. After all, does not the Charter itself declare in its
preamble the determination of all its members to unite their strength to maintain
352
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international peace and security, and "to ensure, by the acceptance of principles
and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the com-
mon interest ..."?6 This is the community that we freely joined. There are
rights and obligations of membership. They are set out in the Charter. There are
certainly problems in the current workings of the United Nations, 7 but they are
not resolved by ignoring or circumventing the United Nations.
The use of international law, or reference to it as a yardstick, by judges in
Australia has come in for criticism. Padraic P. McGuinness is a prolific colum-
nist and is also editor of the widely read conservative magazine Quadrant. In
newspaper columns during the past few years, and now most recently in an edi-
torial in Quadrant, he has attacked a distinguished justice of the Australian High
Court (the equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court), Justice Michael Kirby. Some
of you will remember that Justice Kirby stood where I am standing before you
not long ago giving the Branigin Lecture. Mr. McGuinness attacked what he
called "judicial adventurism" which produces decisions that, unlike legislative
enactments, have retroactive effect. "Where there is no predictability in the law
there is no law, only the fiat of unelected appointees who once appointed are ac-
countable to no one." (Remember that in Australia we do not elect judges at any
level of the judiciary.) Without citing a single case or specific example of Justice
Kirby's adventurism, Mr. McGuinness continued:
But Kirby does not believe that judicial adventurism is without
principle. He relies on another theory. This is unclear, but seems to
be essentially that there are principles of human rights and justice
which are inherently true, and only judicial authorities can define
them. Where do the judges find these principles? Either they make
them up as they go along, or they rely on a theory of natural moral
law, either as defined by, say, Catholic natural law philosophy (as
16. U.N. CHARTER, at pmbl.
17. The U.N. Secretary-General presented a report on Dec. 1, 2004: A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, avail-
able at www.un.org/secureworld/panelmembers.html.
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Justices Brennan' s and Deane 9 did in the Mabo case 20 ) or some
other external doctrine. Kirby calls this "legal policy." 2'
Taking into account Mr. McGuinness' previous writings on this theme, we
can understand his dark reference to "some other external doctrine" as a refer-
ence to international law. He had earlier castigated international conventions on
human rights, the environment, and other topics of relevance to national policy
as having been invented by unelected delegates in Geneva, New York, and other
places, often representing undemocratic states. He sees Justice Kirby, and some
other judges, as smuggling these principles and ideas into Australian law
through the back door.
Justice Kirby has not, of course, responded directly to this attack. Judicial
propriety forbids this. His answers must be found in his published judicial opin-
ions, as well as in extracurial speeches and papers, of which he delivers many. He
recently delivered the Hamlyn Lectures in England. 22 In these lectures he re-
flected on the nature of the judicial function and on the more open acknowledg-
ment today than in the world of forty or more years ago that judges are not mere
automatons mechanically applying rules handed down from the past but do in-
deed make law. But he acknowledges limits to the power ofjudicial lawmaking.
One of Justice Kirby's law teachers, the eminent scholar of jurisprudence and in-
ternational law Julius Stone, invented a telling expression to describe these lim-
its: "the leeways for judicial choice. '23 This expression denotes that there are
fixed poles between which a judge exercises an interstitial competence. The
poles are the provisions of the Constitution or the clear words of a statute. Or
they may be the clear rules of courts standing higher in the judicial hierarchy
than the deciding judge. Or they may, on occasion, be prohibitions founded on
18. Mabo v. Queensland [No.2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. I (Austl.) (Sir Gerard Brennan, majority opinion).
19. Mabo v. Queensland [No.21 (1992) 175 C.L.R. I (Austl.) (Sir William Deane, dissenting).
20. Mabo v. Queensland [No.2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. I (Austl.). This was the case that reversed the
previous understanding of Australian law that the land mass of Australia was terra nullius before
European settlement, and recognized the subsistence of certain aspects of aboriginal land title that
survived settlement. This decision dates prior to Justice Kirby's appointment to the Court.
21. Judicial Adventurism and Public Debate, QUADRANT, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 2-3 (internal citations
added).
22. MICHAEL KIRBY, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2004). Mr. McGuinness very fairly published extracts
from these lectures in the same issue of Quadrant where his censorious editorial appeared. See, e.g.,
Michael Kirby, Beyond theJudicial Fairy Tales, QUADRANT, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 26-33.
23. JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 234, 274-78 (1964).
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public policy. The word "clear," of course, invites consideration in some cases,
where there may well be room for more than one interpretation of the rule in
question. But Justice Kirby recognizes these limits and has demonstrated no de-
sire to move beyond them. In the end, he states, "the duty to deliver and publish
reasons compels a judge to engage in a kind of dialogue between the past and the
present." Smuggling new law through the back door is alien to his nature.
So it is with international law as a source of guidance or inspiration to modern
judges. Where that source is an international convention adhered to by the state,
and the state has not seen fit, or found it necessary, to incorporate its provisions di-
rectly into national law by statute, it remains a statement of rules and standards
that the state has accepted at the executive level. It becomes, therefore, a legitimate
consideration for the courts to take it into account when interpreting a statute, or
developing the common law, but always within the leeways for judicial choice.
The reasons for looking in the direction of international law may not necessarily
be that it is a higher or better source of law than any other, but that the judiciary
should try, so far as possible, not to embarrass the executive in its conduct of for-
eign relations by adopting or entrenching contrary positions at the national level.
For the courts to ignore treaties and conventions, or customary international law,
when not compelled to do so by reason of a contrary prescription of superior force,
would thus injure the state's international reputation. A good example is the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This international instru-
ment has not been given legislative force in Australia. In the United States, by con-
trast, by reason of Article VI of the Constitution it has the rank of a statute.24 In
Australia, courts increasingly look to the Covenant for guidance in the case of gaps
in Australian statute or common law, but only for guidance; the Covenant is not
regarded as itself part of national law.
25
24. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,314 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.). See also I LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-4, at 643-44 (3d ed. 2000).
25. See Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 305 (Austl.). In Dietrich, the High Court
reconsidered its previous holdings that there was no absolute right to free counsel by indigent de-
fendants in criminal cases. It now held that a necessary incident of the right to a fair trial included
professional legal assistance in cases involving potentially serious penalties. It was not, however,
able to implement directly the provisions of article 14 (3)(d) of the Covenant because courts do not,
in Australia, dispose of funds out of which legal assistance is provided. These funds are dispensed
by other public authorities. The Court therefore held that a trial court should, in cases such as
Dietrich, order a stay of proceedings until such time as-by whatever means-the defendant can
appear with legal representation. Id. at 311-12.
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The so-called "democratic deficit" when international law is cited as a
source of such principles, rules, or ideas is an overblown concept. With the pos-
sible exception of a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga-
nization (UNESCO) convention on the "new international information order,"
which years ago led to the withdrawal of the United States from that organiza-
tion and ultimately to the downfall of its director-general (the United States has
since rejoined), international conventions reflect generally acknowledged and
accepted standards. They are democratic in the sense that a majority (normally
two-thirds) of states present at the adopting conference must approve their texts
before opening them for general acceptance. They tend to reflect a lowest com-
mon denominator. The important thing is that they do reflect the world as a
community and put pressure on states to adhere to basic standards. If advanced
states, like Australia and the United States, think that these conventions are only
for others, they fail in their duty to assist less developed countries in understand-
ing the need to strive for higher standards of behavior, not least in relation to
their own citizens. They can do this only by subscribing to those standards them-
selves. There is nothing, however, to prevent more advanced states parties aspir-
ing to higher standards in their own legislation, where appropriate.
2 6
III. THREE AREAS OF FEAR
I have chosen just three examples to illustrate why certain governments
have been fearful of international law in recent times.27 There are others, and
even these three must necessarily be treated briefly. Each could be the subject of
a lecture in its own right.
26. However, in relation to higher national standards that may cause difficulty for other states,
there may be a duty not to exceed the conventional limits. For example, the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, provides in a number of articles that national
laws bearing on freedom of navigation, controlling pollution, and the arrest of vessels may not
exceed the standards agreed to in generally applicable international regulations (principally IMO
instruments).
27. For an overview of the situation in Australia, see generally a recent joint article by four of
my colleagues, Hilary Charlesworth et al., Deep Anxieties: Australia and the International Legal Or-
der, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 423 (2003), available at http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/-slr/v25/n4/
vol%2025%2ONo%204%202003.pdf. See generally JOHN F. MURPHY, UNITED STATES AND THE RULE
OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (2004) (presenting a recent masterly study of the situation in
the United States).
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A. The International Law of the Sea
The international law of the sea is of obvious importance to countries like
Australia and the United States with long coastlines and lengthy lines of com-
munication and commerce by sea. It specifies the permitted breadths of territo-
rial seas, contiguous zones, and continental shelves, and establishes the new
exclusive economic zone and the regime of archipelagic waters. The law of the
sea is also of strategic importance, insofar as it places limits on the power of
coastal states to interfere with navigation and overflight. Issues of protection of
the marine environment and the rational management of fisheries, even of pre-
viously unregulated high seas fisheries, are also dealt with.
It might be thought, therefore, that the United States would have been an
enthusiastic adherent to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,
which resulted from a long process of negotiation from 1973 to 1982. Most of the
issues of importance to the United States, particularly of freedom of navigation
and overflight, were satisfactorily resolved through the negotiation of a bal-
anced package. However, the United States has abstained from signing or rati-
fying the Convention, notwithstanding that more than 140 countries have
become parties. The sticking point was Part XI of the Convention, dealing with
the exploitation of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, i.e., the deep seabed
beyond the limits of the continental shelves and exclusive economic zones of
states. This difficulty emerged late in the Conference, only just after the election
of the Reagan Administration, which had ordered a complete review of the
draft text as it stood at the end of 1981. There was insufficient time for the Con-
ference to consider the many objections raised by the United States to this part of
the draft Convention, which was pledged to hold its concluding sessions in 1982.
Thus the signing ceremony went ahead without the United States.
Without the participation of the United States there was less incentive for
other developed states to ratify the Convention, especially since they would bear
the full weight of the financial contributions required to support the administra-
tion of the Convention. (Under the U.N. formula, contributions are assessed in
relation to GDP. The United States, therefore, pays about 25 percent of the U.N.
budget, and the same percentage in relation to separate funds such as that under
the Law of the Sea Convention; the least developed states pay about 0.06% each.)
Ten years after signing the Convention, the number of ratifying states had still
not reached the minimum number of sixty required for it to enter into force.
These were overwhelmingly developing states. Worse still, it seemed that in
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1993 the Convention was likely to enter into force with the bare number of sixty,
after which the opportunity to amend the Convention would be governed by the
provisions of the Convention that state that a review conference can not be held
for at least fifteen years after entry into force. A group of "Friends of the Con-
vention," which included Australia, looked for a way out of this difficulty. The
group formulated a series of texts, which were designed largely to remove the
objections to Part XI that had been raised by the United States too late in the
Conference. These texts made the regime of the deep seabed more responsive to
free market principles, less bureaucratic in administration, more equitable in its
treatment of entrepreneurs, less able to overrule the views of major interest
groups such as the United States, and more restrictive of third party access to
technology, especially technology having a military value. These texts were then
placed in a free-standing draft "Agreement for the Implementation of Part XI of
the Convention." The Agreement provides that, notwithstanding any contrary
or inconsistent provisions of the Convention, parties to the Agreement will im-
plement the Convention only in accordance with the new Agreement. In 1994,
the U.N. Secretary-General, who had originally been excluded from the group,
endorsed the proposals and put them to a vote in the U.N. General Assembly for
approval. The text was approved, and the Implementing Agreement became an
integral part of the Law of the Sea regime.
The way then seemed clear for the Convention to move ahead with the United
States coming aboard, its earlier objections now having been largely met. But this
was not to be. The other major powers ratified the Agreement, but not the United
States. The Clinton Administration put the Convention and Implementing Agree-
ment to the Senate for approval, but the submission was not even brought forward
for discussion, let alone approval. The then-Chairman of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, refused to place it on the agenda. Now, at
last, under new Committee leadership, the issue is being debated. On October 14,
2003, University of Miami School of Law Professor Bernard H. Oxman, a member
of the U.S. delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference throughout its negotiation,
and other supporters, gave important testimony to the Committee urging ratifica-
tion of the Convention. We await the result.
Professor Oxman rightly pointed out in his testimony that the provisions of
the Law of the Sea Convention have, in most of their principles (save for the
original text of Part XI-the U.S. "footprint" in De Visscher's metaphor being
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absent), achieved a parallel status as customary international law.2" Thus the
United States was able to rely on the customary status of the Convention to assert
navigation and overflight rights and to claim an Exclusive Economic Zone for
itself. But there was still clear advantage to the United States in being able to rely
on specific provisions as binding treaty commitments vis-A-vis other states, as
well as being able to participate and bring influence to bear on the institutions es-
tablished under the Convention.29 These advantages would come only with rat-
ification of the Convention.
I have put this example first because, even in relation to a subject that-
while important-does not go to the heart of American concerns about world
order, there seems to be a fear of becoming tied down to international agree-
ments and international regimes. The objections to the 1994 Agreement, if any,
were never articulated. It seemed to be an objection to binding international
agreements as such.
B. The Use of Force Against Iraq
This example concerns the restraints of an international treaty that un-
doubtedly bind all states: the Charter of the United Nations. There are those
who say that the power and influence of the central guardian of the system of
collective security established by the U.N. Charter, the Security Council, has
been irreparably broken by the events of 2003.3" There are others who consider
that the Charter has been breached, but not broken, by the intervention in Iraq
by the coalition led by the United States. After all, rules are often broken in do-
28. Achieving such parallel status as customary international law was recognized and discussed
in depth by the I.C.J. in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. See North Sea Continental Shelf
(ER.G. v. Den., ER.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,42-46 (Feb. 20).
29. It is disappointing that the customary law character of much of the Convention failed to be
noted as relevant in a recent decision of a U.S. federal court. In a suit brought by an environmental
group against the U.S. government regarding the use by the U.S. Navy of new sonars causing injury
and death to whales, dolphins, and other marine life, the customary law concept of due regard in the
use of the oceans was not raised as a relevant consideration. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans,
279 E Supp. 2d. 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2003). In United States v. Alvarez -Machain, 504 U.S. 655,669 (1992),
international law was swept aside as "a matter for the Executive Branch," not for the courts, by the
majority led by Chief Justice Rehnquist. In dissent, Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Blackmun
and O'Connor joined, argued the relevance of international law in the courts. Id. at 670-71.
30. See generally Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553-642, 803-
872 (2003) (collection of short articles of contrasting views and comments).
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mestic as well as international law. That does not necessarily mean that the sys-
tem no longer has force or value.
But has the Charter been breached? Here we see an interesting difference in
approach to the justification of the use of force against Iraq in 2003 by the United
States and two of its coalition partners, the United Kingdom and Australia. The
latter two found legal justification in prior resolutions of the Security Council. If
that was correct, then there was clearly no breach of the Charter because the Se-
curity Council has the power to authorize the use of armed force. Those prior
resolutions were the resolutions that brought to an end the active hostilities, but
not the right of enforcement action, of the first Iraq war. In 1991, the Security
Council demanded that Iraq meet a large number of conditions relating to its fu-
ture conduct, including full disclosure of its programs of development of weap-
ons of mass destruction and submission to inspections for verification. Security
Council Resolution 1441 of 2002 found Iraq to be in material breach of those ear-
lier resolutions in view of its failure to cooperate fully with the inspection mis-
sions. This resolution, in the view of the United Kingdom and Australia,
revived the right to use force originally mandated by the Security Council in
1991; the enforcement action suspended twelve years earlier could resume.31
Although this argument is valid, in my view, taken by itself, it is rather spoiled
by the fact that, when speaking on the adoption of Resolution 1441 in 2002, both
the U.S. and U.K. representatives in the Security Council explicitly disavowed any
automatic effect of that resolution to resume hostilities.32 This was done to encour-
age other members of the Council to endorse the resolution. Many members (in-
cluding China, France, and Russia) would not have voted in its favor if they had
thought they were voting to use force against Iraq without giving Iraq further
time to conform to the inspection regime. They might well argue estoppel in law,
or at least bad faith in political terms, against the coalition governments.
The United States did not advance the same ground of justification. It ad-
vanced its case principally on the basis of self-defense (particularly anticipatory
31. See Legal Basis for the Use of Force Against Iraq (Mar. 17, 2003) (based on the opinion of Lord
Goldsmith, Attorney-General of the United Kingdom), at http'//www.labour.org.uklegalbasis;
Memorandum of Advice on the Use of Force Against Iraq from Bill Campbell, QC First Assistant
Sec'y Office of Int'l Law Att'y-Gen.'s Dep't & Chris Moraitis, Senior Legal Adviser Dep't of For-
eign Aff. & Trade of Australia (Mar. 12, 2003), at http://www.pm.gov.au/iraq/displayNewsContent.
cfm?refx=96.
32. See Security Council Holds Iraq in 'Material Breach' of Disarmament Obligations, Offers Final
Chance to Comply, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 8-9, U.N. Doc. SC/7564.
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or "preemptive" self-defense) and on the need to secure regime change in Iraq in
order to promote both regional and global security and the human rights of the
oppressed population groups of Iraq.
33
I want to examine both these grounds with an eye more toward the future
than to the past.
1. Humanitarian Intervention
Does such a doctrine exist in international law, compatible with the Char-
ter? Writing before the intervention in Iraq in 2003, Professor Ian Brownlie of
Oxford stated that the so-called right of humanitarian intervention was contrary
to the U.N. Charter, but that in extreme cases of humanitarian need, where the
Security Council had been unable to agree to act owing to political divisions in
its ranks, intervention might be excusable, even though unlawful. In this he
drew the rather curious parallel of how prosecutors overlook some cases of eu-
thanasia under domestic law.34 "Illegal but excusable" also appears to be the po-
sition of Australian scholar Simon Chesterman in his recent widely noted study
of humanitarian intervention.
35
I find this a deeply unsatisfying conclusion. The law must surely make sense
and must ultimately conform to what is right. There is sound political sense in
the justification given by British Prime Minister Tony Blair for the earlier inter-
vention by NATO in Kosovo and the bombing of Serbia without the authoriza-
tion of the Security Council: "We did it because it was right to do so."'36 The law
should try to conform to what is politically and morally sound. There can, of
course, be no right of states to take the law into their own hands and to make
judgments about humanitarian intervention lightly, or as a mere pretext to act in
advancing their own particular interests. The tests of true humanitarian inter-
vention have been persuasively articulated by the Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, co-chaired by the former
Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, and Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun
33. See Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary (Feb. 28, 2003), at http'//
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-5.html. See also William H. Taft IV &
Todd F Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557-63 (2003).
34. Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 139, 146 (R. Lillich ed., 1973).
35. SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? 87 (2001).
36. United Kingdom Materials on International Law, 1999 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 586; 2000 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 649-650.
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of Algeria. The Report, sponsored and published by the Government of Canada
in 2001, makes a powerful case for humanitarian intervention, but as a responsi-
bility rather than as a right. The Report stresses the need to base humanitarian
enforcement actions within chapter VII of the Charter, and calls upon the Secu-
rity Council to exercise its powers and duties responsibly and on an objective
view of the facts of each case. Nevertheless, the Report does envisage, even while
deploring the need for, actions by individual states or coalitions of states to inter-
vene where the Security Council fails to act.37
Humanitarian intervention was not a primary ground of justification for the
intervention in Iraq, although it was sometimes mentioned as a secondary ground
or a desirable by-product. No one defends the regime of Saddam Hussein or fails
to acknowledge the horrific abuses of human rights inflicted by his regime on the
people of Iraq. Whether it could have been justified on that ground alone involves
weighing a number of factors, including prudential considerations. It is unneces-
sary to do that here, other than to point to the Report of International Commission
which outlines the relevant factors.38 It is enough to say that humanitarian inter-
vention as an exception to the prohibition of the use of force under the Charter has
inevitably demanded renewed consideration following events in Somalia, Rwanda,
Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Congo, East Timor, and Sudan, among others.
Where the Security Council fails to act by endorsing forcible intervention in
cases of extreme humanitarian need, I would find authority in article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter for coalitions of the willing, or even-under still stricter condi-
tions-of individual states, to act without a mandate from the Security Council.
That paragraph reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
37. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
53-55 (2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY].
38. Id. at 32. These conditions owe much to traditional just war theory. A brief modern restate-
ment of the just war theory (which goes back to St. Augustine) is contained in the document of the
Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World, also known
as Gaudium et Spes. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH IN THE
MODERN WORLD 79 (1965). A more lengthy exposition, applied to the case of Iraq, was given by
the Anglican (Episcopalian) Chief Chaplain to the Australian Armed Forces, Bishop Tom Frame,
in an article in The Australian. See Tom Frame, Battle Hymn for a Three Week War, AUSTRALIAN,
Feb. 11,2003, at 11.
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dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
39
This is a curiously worded paragraph. It owes much to the drafting of Austra-
lia's Foreign Minister, Dr. H.V. Evatt, at the San Francisco Conference in 1945.
Why did it not say simply "No Member shall threaten or use force against any
other state" (except, of course, in self-defense or under the authority of the Security
Council, which is implicit under either wording)? Most authorities on the Charter
maintain, on the basis of the travauxprparatoires, that this was indeed the intention
of the delegates to the San Francisco Conference. But it has to be conceded, at least
on the face of it, that the words following "force" would then be mere verbiage. If,
however, those words were not mere verbiage or surplusage but were intended to
clarify the meaning of the first part of the sentence, then the additional words can
well be read as words of qualification. Thus it can be postulated that if a threat or
use of force were aimed not at territorial integrity or political independence (as
would be the case of naked aggression, invasion, annexation, or occupation), but
were intended to right a manifest injustice where peaceful methods had failed, it
would not be prohibited by the Charter. This more elastic reading of article 2(4) is
favored by a number of scholars, albeit a minority, as allowing for forcible inter-
vention in order to prevent grave and widespread abuses of human rights, such as
genocide.4" The scholars who support this position include Julius Stone,
4
' Derek
Bowett,42 and Anthony D'Amato.43 A justification for the intervention by NATO
in Kosovo in 1999, based on article 2(4), was advanced by Belgium in the case
brought by Yugoslavia before the International Court of Justice.4
Although a number of current scholars, including Simon Chesterman, con-
sider this interpretation of article 2(4) unsupported by past state practice, the ques-
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
40. See CHESTERMAN, SUpra note 35, at 47-48 (critically reviewing these views).
41. JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 43 (1958).
42. D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (1958).
43. ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 56-72 (1995).
44. Thus this is not an intervention against the territorial integrity or independence of
the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The purpose of NATO's intervention is to res-
cue a people in peril, in deep distress. For this reason the Kingdom of Belgium takes
the view that this is an armed humanitarian intervention, compatible with article 2,
paragraph 4, of the Charter, which covers only intervention against the territorial
integrity or political independence of a State.
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), CR 99/15 (May 10, 1999), at http'//www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeframe.htm.
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tion now is whether such an interpretation should be admitted in order to give to
individual states (or-better in political terms-coalitions of states) the necessary
legal basis under the Charter to do what is morally right, where the Security Coun-
cil has failed in its duty to address the humanitarian situation dispassionately and
reasonably. It is a general legal principle that a document, be it a contract, a statute,
or a treaty (as here the U.N. Charter), is open to purposive interpretation in order
to respond to new circumstances or needs, so long as that interpretation can fairly
be regarded as within the meaning of the words of the document. The fact that a
more restrictive interpretation may have been given in the past is not an insupera-
ble obstacle. Moreover, the U.N. Charter should be viewed similarly to a constitu-
tion. To adhere to rigid interpretations or to be unwilling to allow growth and
development in understanding is to render the instrument brittle and may lead to
rupture and disillusion. In my view, a wider interpretation must be given to article
2(4) in order to make the Charter relevant to the present and foreseeable future
needs of the international community. In adopting that view, I would fully endorse
the precautionary conditions set out in the Report of the International Commis-
sion on Intervention and State Sovereignty as giving valid guidance as to the occa-
sions on which such intervention may be justified. These conditions are
principally: right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable pros-
pects of success.45 In other words, intervention should not be embarked upon if the
remedy would likely be worse than the disease.46
45. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 37.
46. Considerations that arise in the aftermath of the intervention in Iraq are well canvassed in
the series of articles collected in the Agora section of the American Journal of International Law in
volume 97. See generally Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Editors' Introduction, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 553-57 (2003) (introducing a group of articles on the intervention in Iraq); Taft & Buch-
wald, supra note 33, at 557-63 (2003) (arguing that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a lawful action);
John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563-76 (2003) (arguing that the
intervention in Iraq was authorized based on Security Council resolutions and the 1991 cease-fire
resolution); Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemp-
tive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 576--85 (2003) (arguing for a U.N. Charter interpretation that
allows for flexibility in reacting to evolving security challenges); Richard N. Gardner, Neither
Bush nor the "Jurisprudes," 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 585-90 (2003) (arguing that the doctrine of preemp-
tion is an unnecessary expansion of the concept of self-defense); Richard A. Falk, What Future for
the UNCharter System of War Prevention ?, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 590-98 (2003) (comparing the Kosovo
intervention with Iraq intervention and arguing that the Iraq intervention was illegitimate);
Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599-607
(2003) (arguing that the doctrine of preemption is a radical change and is dangerous); Franck,
supra note 15, at 607-20 (arguing that the intervention in Iraq demonstrates a disregard for the
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2. SelfDefense, Especially "Preemptive" Self-Defense
The right of self-defense, which is part of general international law,4 7 is rec-
ognized in article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
48 It is stated there to be an "inherent 49
right of states to act in individual or collective self-defense pending the taking of
effective action by the Security Council to deal with an act of aggression. Article
51 speaks of this right as arising "ifan armed attack occurs.""° No one reads these
words today so literally as to require that a state remain passive until after the
first blow has been delivered by an aggressor. Since April 1945, when the Char-
ter was adopted, the advent of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction
has rendered such a narrow interpretation untenable. Some degree of anticipa-
tion must be allowed in deciding when an armed attack begins, so that a poten-
tially catastrophic attack may be averted. The degree of danger must be assessed
in light of the capabilities of modern weaponry. Moreover, the degree of antici-
pation allowed must take into account the existence of increasingly sophisticated
devices that can detect and give warning of imminent threats. In other words,
the law must keep pace with modern technology.
"Anticipatory self-defense" has been criticized as too broad and self-judging
a doctrine to be left to the unfettered discretion of states. For example, does the
development of nuclear weapons by a likely aggressor constitute grounds for
Charter and further arguing that the invasion was not justified); Tom J. Farer, The Prospect for In-
ternational Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 621-28 (2003) (discussing the ef-
fect of the Iraq invasion on international norms); Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A
Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 628-42 (2003) (considering the impact of the Iraq interven-
tion on the U.N. Charter); Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Editors' Note, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 803-04 (2003) (summarizing articles on the Iraq conflict); Carsten Stahn, Enforcement of
the Collective Will After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 804-23 (2003) (discussing the implications of the
Iraq intervention); Thomas D. Grant, The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 823-42 (2003) (discussing the relationship between the Security Council and the re-
building of Iraqi self-governance); David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
842-60 (2003) (discussing international law as it concerns the occupation and rebuilding of Iraq);
Eyal Benvenisti, Water Conflicts During the Occupation of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 860-72 (2003)
(discussing the occupiers' obligations concerning Iraq's water supply).
47. It is important to understand that the right of self-defense did not originate in the U.N.
Charter but is part of customary and general international law. This was clearly recognized by the
International Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).




seeking to remove that threat before the aggressor has had time to activate and
deploy them? Such was the justification given by Israel of its attack on the
Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, when intelligence reports gave strong
grounds for believing that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons for use against
Israel."l A widespread opinion at that time was that this action drew too long a
bow. Professor Yoram Dinstein believes that the action went beyond the bound-
aries of legitimate self-defense. In recognizing that article 51 must allow for
some degree of anticipation, he seeks to confine it to actions in immediate self-
defense, in cases where the aggressor has shown that it is unmistakably and irre-
vocably committed to an attack. He calls this "interceptive self-defense."52 It is
proper to seek to confine the right narrowly, but it is difficult to do so except in
light of particular circumstances. In the end, at least as exercised by a permanent
member of the Security Council (which may veto a condemnatory resolution), it
is a matter for judgment by the wider international community whether the ac-
tion was justified.
The resolutions adopted by the Security Council after the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon (and the foiled attack on the White
House) on September 11, 2001 are notable for the recognition, in their preambu-
lar paragraphs, that the right of self-defense under article 51 of the Charter ex-
tends beyond attacks by states to attacks by non-state actors, such as terrorists. It
is therefore possible to consider together defensive action against both.
Much has been made in recent comments of the alleged promotion by the
U.S. government of a novel doctrine of "preemptive attack." It is necessary to ex-
amine exactly what has been said in the relevant documents. What the United
States has announced-and which might be regarded as new doctrine-is that
it may take preemptive action against terrorists. It is not stated as an extension of
the right of self-defense against states. In The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America, published by the White House in September 2002, it is
stated thus:
We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by ... defend-
ing the United States, the American people, and our interests at
51. See TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ISRAELI RAID
ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR 16-18 (1998); see also A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE:
THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II, 287-89 (1997).
52. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 189-91 (2d ed. 1994).
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home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before
it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly
strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will
not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-
defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent
them from doing harm against our people and our country ....
The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerg-
ing threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for ag-
gression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and
actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United
States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. We will always
proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions.
53
These remarks were clarified in January 2003 by the Legal Adviser to the
State Department, William Howard Taft IV:
The United States, or any other nation, should not use force to
pre-empt every emerging threat or as a pretext for aggression. We
are fully aware of the delicacy of this situation we have gotten
into. After the exhaustion of peaceful remedies, and after careful
consideration of the consequences, in face of overwhelming evi-
dence of an imminent threat, though, a nation may take pre-
emptive action to defend its nationals from catastrophic harm.
54
Note the prudential character of the words "overwhelming," "imminent," and
"catastrophic." These are consistent with a conservative reading of the right of
self-defense in an era of weapons of mass destruction, whether we are speaking
of actions against terrorists as such, or against hostile states.
53. White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 17, 2002) 15-16,
available at http://whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf; National Security Asserts Legitimacy of "Preemptive"
Use of Force, 14 FOREIGN POL'y BULL. 225, 231 (2003).
54. William Howard Taft, IV, Remarks at the Foreign Policy Association discussion, Pre-emp-
tive Force: When can it be used? Implications for Iraq and North Korea, transcript available at
http://www.fpa.org/topics-info 2 4 14/topics info-show.htm?docid = 142893, quoted in Andru E.
Wall, Lawfully Defending the Peace: The Bush Doctrine and the Global War on Terrorism, 4 ENGAGE
95, 100 (2003).
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Terrorists cannot operate from bases outside the territory or jurisdiction of
any state. So how may measures of self-defense be taken against terrorists with-
out affecting the territorial sovereignty of the country from which they operate,
or in which they may be found? In cases of immediate (and "interceptive") self-
defense, it must be that the territorial sovereignty of the place from which the at-
tack has been, or is immediately about to be, launched, is unavoidably infringed
as a matter of necessity. The principles agreed to in the correspondence between
Great Britain and the United States following the Caroline incident of 1837 still
have application today, where the victim state can show a "necessity of self-
defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation. 5 5 "[The action taken must also involve] nothing unreasonable or
excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited
by that necessity, and kept clearly within it."56 The defense of immediate neces-
sity thus excuses the breach of territorial sovereignty.
In the case of preemptive self-defense, however, greater circumspection is
required. Professor Dinstein proposes a category of self-defense that can be ap-
plied to such cases. He terms it "extraterritorial law enforcement."57 He consid-
ers that where a terrorist, who has committed criminal acts in the territory or
jurisdiction of a state, is found in any other state, the authorities of the latter state
are to be called on by the victim state to surrender or prosecute the terrorist in ac-
cordance with international law.58 If the state is unwilling, or unable, to take
these measures of international law enforcement, then the victim state may itself
undertake the task of capturing the terrorist or destroying the terrorist base, as
the case may be.59 Clearly this doctrine cannot be applied except where the state
from which the terrorist attack was launched or directed has been given suffi-
cient opportunity to enforce the law itself. And it must be exercised only with the
55. Letter from Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster, U.S. Secretary of State (July 28, 1842) reprinted
in 30 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS, 1841-1842, 195, 196 (1858). The language of this formula, al-
though sometimes closely parsed as though it were a statute, overlooks the hyperbole common in
pleading a partisan cause. The essence of the formulation is contained in the notions of necessity,
reasonableness, and proportionality. For a cogent analysis of the Caroline formula, see Wall, supra
note 54, at 98-99.
56. Letter from Mr. Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841) reprinted in 29
BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS, 1840-1841, 1129, 1138 (1857).
57. DINSTEIN,SUpra note 52, at 237-45.
58. There are a number of international conventions criminalizing acts of terrorism and requir-
ing international cooperation in their suppression. See infra note 63.
59. See DINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 237-41.
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utmost care for observance of thejus in bello (i.e., the principles and rules of in-
ternational humanitarian law), especially for the protection of innocent civilian
lives and property.
While Professor Dinstein links this doctrine to the right of self-defense,
which is certainly arguable, I prefer to locate it, as earlier argued, in article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter. I see it as an example of a use of force that is not directed
"against" territorial integrity or political independence but as a use of force consis-
tent with the Purposes of the United Nations. It is true that, in the case of an un-
reasonable refusal by a state to prosecute or hand over a terrorist, extraterritorial
law enforcement would necessarily breach the territorial integrity of that state and
would also, for the moment, take the power of political control out of its hands,
but these would be necessarily incidental effects rather than the object of the use
of force in itself. An earlier example was the raid by Israeli forces on Entebbe Air-
port in Uganda in 1976 in order to free hostages being held there by Palestinian hi-
jackers with the apparent connivance of the Ugandan authorities.' A more recent
example is the intervention by coalition forces in 2001 to 2002 in Afghanistan in
pursuit of AI-Qaeda, after the Taliban government had been called upon to surren-
der Osama bin Laden and had refused-indeed had joined forces with Al-Qaeda.
I also believe that the attacks by the coalition against Iraq in 2003 can be ex-
plained best as extraterritorial law enforcement. Whether Iraq really had weap-
ons of mass destruction at the time the attacks were launched in March 2003 is
now a highly controversial issue. It would appear that they did not, and that the
intelligence upon which the United States and the United Kingdom acted was
faulty. That, however, does not serve retroactively to invalidate the attacks as le-
gitimate self-defense. There is no doubt that Iraq did possess weapons of mass de-
struction. The evidence of their use against Iran and against the Kurdish
population of Iraq between 1980 and 1990 is unchallenged. Moreover, U.N.
weapons inspectors from 1991 onwards discovered and neutralized many such
weapons, or material capable of making such weapons, until their inspections
were halted by Iraq. The real point is that Iraq failed to cooperate with the inspec-
tion missions mandated by the Security Council, and behaved (out of bravado or
for whatever reasons) as though they had something to hide. Iraq stood in flagrant
violation of resolutions of the Security Council, binding upon it, through its fail-
ure to cooperate. This conclusion was reaffirmed by Security Council Resolution
60. See generally Michael Akehurst, The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad, 5 INT'L REL. 3
(1977). See also Francis A. Boyle, The Entebbe Hostage Crisis, 29 NETH. INT'LL. REV. 32 (1982).
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1441. Seeing no prospect of compliance, and after numerous warnings, the coali-
tion went in to enforce those resolutions. The fact that Iraq resisted the enforce-
ment changed the action from law enforcement to armed conflict, with the result
that it could then be defeated and occupied like any party to an armed conflict. But
that does not affect the initial character, and validity, of the action.
C. Anti-Terrorist Legislation"6
Both Australia and the United States have enacted new anti-terrorist legisla-
tion since the events of September 11, 2001. In the United States there is the USA
PATRIOT Act, among other pieces of related legislation. In Australia there are
the amendments to the Criminal Code and the Australian Security Intelligence
Organization (ASIO) Act, the latter of which for the first time has given powers
of arrest and detention for questioning to officers of Australia's intelligence orga-
nization. In addition, military tribunals have been established by the President,
under executive powers given to him by Congress, to try persons detained on the
battlefields of Afghanistan and kept for the present in custody at U.S. Naval facil-
ities at Guantlnamo Bay, Cuba.62
61. For notable recent contributions to this theme, see generally Symposium, 'A War Against
Terrorism': What Role for International Law? U.S. and European Perspectives, 14 EUR. J. OF INT'L L.
209 (2003) and especially Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and
Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 241 (2003).
62. These "battlefield detainees," of uncertain legal status, include two Australians: David
Hicks and Mamdouh Habib. The trial of the first was announced, in January 2004, as imminent.
He has been assigned U.S. military counsel, Major Mori. Whether the U.S. Naval Base at
GuantAnamo Bay, leased from Cuba, is a place to which the U.S. Constitution-and thus a right
to the writ of habeas corpus-applies has been answered differently by U.S. courts. The Supreme
Court has now ruled that a right to habeas corpus is enjoyed by detainees at Guantfnamo Bay. See
Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 159 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004). The Human Rights Committee of the
United Nations, in a draft General Comment on article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, has declared that States Parties to the Covenant
are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and ensure the Covenant rights to
all persons who may be within their territory and to all personas subject to their ju-
risdiction. This means that a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in
the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if
not situated within the territory of the State Party.
Draft General Comment (May 5, 2003), The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.3, available at http://www.ohchr.org (em-
phasis added).
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Time does not permit a review of this legislation, or of the critical comment
on it that has come from many quarters that include, but are not limited to, civil
liberties groups. I intend to focus, consistently with the theme of this address, on
the international law dimensions of the legislative reactions to the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001.
The need for adequate legislation worldwide to respond to terrorism was
endorsed, in urgent terms, by the United Nations itself within days of the at-
tacks. In Resolution 1373 (2001), the Security Council called upon all members
of the United Nations to report, within ninety days, on the steps they had taken
to ensure that "terrorist acts are established as serious offenses in domestic laws
and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such acts." The resolu-
tion further required states to criminalize the provision of funds to terrorists,
and to freeze the financial assets of persons who commit terrorist acts. The res-
olution also required states to review their laws relating to banking practices,
arms control, law enforcement, cooperation in the suppression of terrorism, and
other matters concerned with security.
The intention of the United Nations is obviously to ensure that a tight net-
work of reciprocating laws is in place to deal with the prevention and punish-
ment of terrorist acts. Provided that the laws of a state in which a terrorist
suspect is located provide that the terrorist's acts are contrary to the law of that
state, the state has a choice either to prosecute the person itself or to extradite him
or her to a state requesting surrender and that has jurisdiction over the act com-
mitted. In international law this is known as the principle aut dedere autjudicare
("either extradite or prosecute"), and has been a standard feature of all interna-
tional conventions on international criminal law since the 1970 Hague Conven-
tion on the hijacking of aircraft.63
The formula "either extradite or prosecute" has a greater significance than
might at first sight be thought. Although there is no obligation in general to extra-
63. The most important worldwide terrorism-related conventions are: Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, Dec. 16, 1970; Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Montreal, Sept. 23, 1971; Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents, New York, Dec. 14, 1973; International Convention Against the Taking of Hos-
tages, New York, Dec. 17, 1979; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Air-
ports Serving International Aviation, Montreal, Feb. 28, 1988; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome, Mar. 10, 1988; International Con-
vention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, New York, Dec. 15, 1997; International Conven-
tion for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York, Dec. 9, 1999.
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dite criminals under customary international law, extradition being governed by
treaties and domestic law, the obligation to do so, or to prosecute, under interna-
tional criminal conventions meets three particular difficulties. In the first place,
terrorist acts are normally committed for political motives and might therefore
come under the exception, found in extradition treaties, of political offenders or
those who might, if extradited, face prosecution for political motives. Efforts are
underway at the United Nations to draft a comprehensive definition of terrorism
that would exclude it altogether as a political offense for the purposes of extradi-
tion. But, these efforts have bogged down owing to a split of opinion in the Com-
mittee in relation to the characterization of Palestinian liberation groups.6' Failing
an accepted definition, if the present laws of some states would characterize a sus-
pect as a political offender, then it is absolutely required to investigate with a view
to prosecute the suspect. The second difficulty it avoids is that the laws of many
states exempt their own citizens from extradition. This is not so in the cases of
Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, but is so in the European
countries. Thus if a French citizen is accused of a terrorist offense committed in
the United States, he or she cannot be extradited to the United States, but under
international conventions, France will be obliged to submit the case to its own
prosecution authorities. The third difficulty is the death penalty, which is appli-
cable under U.S. federal law to many terrorist offenses. The laws of a large num-
ber of countries now exclude extradition to a place where the death penalty may
be imposed or carried out. One way around the difficulty is for the requested state
to offer extradition conditionally upon an assurance that the death penalty, if im-
posed, will be commuted to a sentence of imprisonment.
This last is perhaps the most difficult hurdle of all. The United States is be-
coming increasingly isolated among the developed nations by reason of its ad-
herence to the death penalty.6" I shall not here take sides on this contentious
64. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17
December 1996, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. 37, U.N. Doc. A/57/37; Article 18 of the draft
comprehensive convention, available at http'//www.un.org/law/terrorism/index.html. The Ad Hoc
Committee resumed its consideration of the draft convention at its session in 2003 but made no
progress in resolving the deadlock, which it decided to refer to the U.N. Sixth Committee.
65. See the scathing comment by Justice Scalia on Justice Stevens' invocation of the views of the
world community in relation to the death penalty in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 335, 370
(2002). For an example of a parallel clash of judicial views occurring in the High Court of Austra-
lia, see J. McHugh's and J. Kirby's opinions in Al Kateb v. Godwin (2004), available at httpi/
www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high-ct/2004/37.html.
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issue. I shall merely observe that it can be expected that there will be cases in the
future of terrorists found in foreign countries where the executive branch of the
federal government, having requested extradition, may be obliged to give assur-
ances to a requested state that the death penalty, if imposed, will be automati-
cally commuted, as the price of justice. The political consequences of this are
manifest, where people convicted of less serious non-terrorist offenses are regu-
larly executed.
Is there a standard against which one can measure the necessity and reason-
ableness of the laws passed in Australia, the United States, and other countries to
combat terrorism? I wish to suggest that, far from being a nuisance or an irrele-
vance, international law does offer both guidance, and-to a degree-validation
of, measures necessary to combat the scourge of terrorism.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was
adopted in 1966 as one of a trilogy of instruments that makes up the "Interna-
tional Bill of Rights" (the others being the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights). It has been adhered to by 150 countries, including Australia and the
United States. It is a statement in precise terms of the basic rights of the human
person. As such, it stands as a benchmark against which the laws and practices of
members of the international community are to be measured. These members
must appear before the Committee on Human Rights, established under the
Covenant, every five years (or more often if called upon) to give an account of
their observance of these standards.
Aspects of anti-terrorist measures inevitably give rise to questions of their
compatibility with provisions of the Covenant, in particular those provisions re-
lating to length of detention after arrest (article 9), the right to a public trial be-
fore an independent and impartial tribunal, the right to be tried without undue
delay, the right to counsel (article 14), and the right to privacy (article 17). All of
these rights are subject to exceptions or qualifications that are reasonable in all
the circumstances. The term "arbitrary," which appears in many of these provi-
sions, such as "no person shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy.. ." (article 17), means "unreasonable" in the understanding of
the Committee. 66
66. M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 10 (Engel, Ar-
lington VA, 1993).
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It might be thought that the Covenant is sufficiently elastic through its "rea-
sonableness" criteria to accommodate the inevitable inroads on personal liberties
made by recent anti-terrorism legislation. Neither Australia nor the United
States have yet availed themselves of the right to derogate from their obligations
under the Covenant, which is allowed under article 4:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Par-
ties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from
their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the
ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.
The article then goes on to specify certain non-derogable rights, such as the
right to life and the prohibition of torture, and also to require that any derogations
be notified to other parties through the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
There would be an understandable reluctance to make a public proclamation
of an emergency necessary to trigger these provisions, even after such catastrophic
events as those of September 11, 2001, for fear of spreading panic in the commu-
nity, or appearing to confess the inability of the government to take effective mea-
sures against terrorists within existing law, or within the framework of special
laws considered to be compatible with basic norms of human rights. Nevertheless,
by contrast to Australia, both the United States and the United Kingdom declared
states of emergency after September 1 1th. The United Kingdom additionally
gave notification of derogation from article 9(1) of the Covenant in respect of the
detention of foreign nationals intended to be deported from the United Kingdom
under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act.67 The fact that the
United Kingdom has taken this step, in conscientious adherence to its interna-
tional obligations, may also be a reflection of the fact that the United Kingdom
has, in the past, made declarations of emergency and derogation in relation to
Northern Ireland, and to that extent the British public are not unused to them.
The fact that article 4(2) lists certain articles of the Covenant as being non-
derogable (e.g., the right to life and the prohibitions of torture and slavery) and
67. Notice of derogation dated Dec. 18, 2001.
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that the non-derogable rights do not include articles 9 and 14, considered above,
does not mean that those provisions can be set aside entirely when an emergency
is proclaimed and the derogation is communicated to the U.N. Secretary-General.
On this the Human Rights Committee made an important pronouncement in
2001, just prior to the events of September 1 th. In General Comment No. 29 on
Derogations During a State of Emergency,"8 the Committee explained that:
[T]he obligation to limit any derogations to those strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation reflects the principle of propor-
tionality which is common to derogation and limitation powers.
Moreover, the mere fact that a permissible derogation from a spe-
cific provision may, of itself, be justified by the exigencies of the
situation does not obviate the requirement that specific measures
taken pursuant to the derogation must also be shown to be re-
quired by the exigencies of the situation. In practice, this will
ensure that no provision of the Covenant, however validly dero-
gated from will be entirely inapplicable to the behaviour of a state
party.... The legal obligation to narrow down all derogations to
those strictly required by the exigencies of the situation establishes
both for States parties and for the Committee a duty to conduct a
careful analysis under each article of the Covenant based on an
objective assessment of the actual situation.69
The Committee also emphasized that measures derogating from the provi-
sions of the Covenant "must be of an exceptional and temporary nature." It must
be wondered whether, in an age of terrorism, special measures, if they are of
such a nature as to require formal notification as derogations, could ever be re-
garded as "temporary." It is likely that they are here to stay. In light of the events
of September 11, 2001, the Committee may have to revisit this aspect of its Gen-
eral Comment in a future Comment.
68. General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. CCPR 56th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001). In this General Comment, it is evident that the Committee had
regard for the earlier work of two nongovernmental groups of experts whose recommendations
are worthy of study. See I nt'l L. Assoc., Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State
of Emergency (1984), reprinted in 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1072 (1985); Siracusa Principles on Limitation and
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 41st
Sess., E/CN.4/1985/4 (1984), reprinted in 7 HUM. RTs. Q. 1 (1985).
69. General Comment No. 29, supra note 68, 4,6.
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In my opinion, knee-jerk reactions of horror at restrictions on certain rights
are not helpful to the general cause of human rights in an age of terrorism. There
must be a sober analysis of the dangers posed by terrorists, and of the measures
necessary to forestall and combat them. We in Australia and the United States are
more alive to the importance of human rights and civil liberties than the peoples
of many other countries, as our histories show. Nevertheless, while we may feel
ourselves to be qualified and equipped by our laws and political traditions to face
these challenges, useful guidance is to be found in the international standards out-
lined above. Above all, the considerations of strict proportionality set out in Gen-
eral Comment No. 29 of the Human Rights Committee should be pondered.
There is, unfortunately, no indication that such guidance has been sought in the
counsel of our governments or even, so it would seem, in public debate.
CONCLUSION
It has been evident that at many points international law has been ignored
or pushed to the sidelines by the governments of the United States and-to a
lesser extent-Australia. My thesis has been that this is not only wrong, but un-
necessary, since the objectives we strive to attain may be made compatible with
international law. Our security is made stronger if we can bring the rest of the
international community with us and show that we are prepared to live by the
same rules as all.
Some years ago when I was a new faculty member of a certain law school in
Australia, I attended my first staff meeting, at which the dean outlined a certain
proposal for adoption. He spoke very eloquently and persuasively in favor of its
approval. When the time came to vote I put up my hand, but noticed that the
colleague sitting next to me, and several others, did not. I asked the colleague
later, "why did you vote against such a sensible motion?" His answer was, "I
wasn't really against it, and I knew it would be passed, but I just can't stand how
the Dean is always so very right." I was reminded of this when last year Libya
was elected to the Chair of the U.N. Human Rights Commission (the political
body of fifty-three, not to be confused with the Human Rights Committee of
eighteen independent experts, mentioned earlier). How could the representative
of a rogue state be elected to the chair of a body dedicated to the advancement of
human rights? The answer, it would seem, is that a substantial number of dele-
gates simply wanted to do something to annoy the United States, feeble and
scarcely important in its practical consequences though it might be, by remind-
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ing it that there were others out there. Much has been muttered "out there"
about the refusal of the United States to adhere to the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, the rather heavy-handed pressure on states to conclude
so-called article 98 agreements for the non-surrender of U.S. nationals to the In-
ternational Criminal Court, opposition to the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warm-
ing, and some other popular international proposals. This has been termed
"American exceptionalism." And it is resented.
Australian scholar and commentator Owen Harries has recently written that
Americans are presently divided over their nation's core beliefs, and that "American
exceptionalism" is a key factor. On the one side there are those who believe that the
intentions of the United States are benign and can only bring good to the rest of the
world. Everyone should recognize this. On the other side are those who recall that
even the founding fathers of the United States were not prepared to trust in benign
intentions, but instead established a constitution in which there was a balance of
powers, each capable of curbing and restraining the other. "It is that same distrust
that underpins the concept of balance of power in international politics." Professor
Harries concludes that "[t]he really interesting and important debate is not between
anti-Americans and pro-Americans; it is between two different American tradi-
tions concerning how the US can best promote its values and ideals." 0
I have argued today that international law is a necessary curb and restraint
on the exercise of power, and that it should be recognized more widely as such,
not only at the executive level but also at the judicial and legislative levels.7' I
have also argued that international law is sometimes enabling and empowering;
it should not always be seen in terms of prohibiting or restraining. In whichever
70. Owen Harries, A New Threat to the United States From Within, Fifth Lecture in the Austl.
Broad. Comm'n 2003 Boyer Lecture Series, in SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 12, 2003, at 13.
71. Recall the extraordinary action of Congress in passing legislation blatantly violating the U.N.
Headquarters Agreement, which was the subject of an Advisory Opinion by the I.C.J. See Applica-
bility of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of26
June 1947,1988 I.C.J. 12 (Apr. 28,1988). Two months after the I.C.J. had ruled unanimously that the
United States was thereby in dispute with the United Nations and was required to arbitrate the dif-
ference, a federal court managed to interpret the offending legislation, which had been used to order
the closure of the Observer Mission to the United Nations of the Palestine Liberation Organization,
as not applying to a mission accredited to the United Nations and covered by the Agreement. See
United States v. PLO, 695 F Supp. 1456, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("It has been a maxim of statutory
construction since the decision in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,118 (1804), that
'an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other construc-
tion remains."' (quoting Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25,32 (1982)).
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regard, our governments need to be more attentive to the claims international
law justly make on our allegiance (my own government especially in relation to
the treatment of asylum seekers in detention 72 -in which respect the United
States has a much better record).
At the World Economic Forum held at Davos, Switzerland in January 2004,
speakers were invited to answer a simple question: what advice
would they give the next president of the United States? "Listen
to others," said Thierry de Montbrial, head of a French policy
research institute. Irene Khan, secretary-general of Amnesty In-
ternational, said, "Look around the world. And remember the
impact of your power."
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72. For a comparative study of the treatment of asylum seekers in Australia, the United King-
dom, and the United States, see FRANK BRENNAN, TAMPERING WITH ASYLUM: A UNIVERSAL Hu-
MANITARIAN PROBLEM (2003).
73. Alan Cowell, Anti-Americanism May Be Fading, But Forum Is No Love Fest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
24, 2004, at 2.
